Outlook and appraisal [November 2008] by Ashcroft, Brian
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Ashcroft, Brian (2008) Outlook and appraisal [November 2008]. Fraser of Allander Economic
Commentary, 32 (2). pp. 4-17. ISSN 2046-5378
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
Pages 4-17 
Outlook 
and  
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Overview 
 
  
There is a high probability that the Scottish 
economy will go into recession in 2009. 
Recession is the likely outcome of the global 
financial crisis, which was triggered by the 
collapse of the house price bubble, initially in 
the United States, massive foreclosures in 
the US sub-prime mortgage market, and 
significant bank and hedge fund losses 
across the globe as the value of innovative 
investments based on sub-prime mortgages 
collapsed.  The uncertain solvency of many 
financial institutions has generated a loss of 
confidence and trust in the banking system of 
sufficient scale to produce what one 
distinguished analyst and commentator has 
called the “consequent disintegration of the 
credit mechanism.”i 
 
An examination of previous recessions 
supports the view that cyclical fluctuations of 
Scottish GDP have less amplitude than in the 
UK economy. What this means is that the 
business cycle has tended to be effectively 
flatter in Scotland and so both upswings and 
downswings are less severe here than in the 
UK. We consider that the scale of the 
downturn confronting us will probably be less 
severe than the 1980/81 recession, 
principally because in that recession, 
monetary and fiscal policy effectively 
accommodated, even exacerbated, the 
recession and was not used counter-
cyclically to combat it.  That will not happen 
on this occasion as the recent swingeing cuts 
in interest rates in the UK and the US, and 
the willingness to borrow more and run up 
higher levels of public debt, indicate. 
However, we are less sure that the Scottish 
economy will weather the coming downturn 
better than the UK.  
 
The impact of the present crisis will depend 
on the scale of the deflation of house and 
property prices in the Scottish market, the 
extent of the impact on local financial service 
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activities, and the mechanism governing the 
spread to the wider Scottish economy. 
 
On the housing and property market effects, 
we judge that the absolute and relative fall in 
house prices is likely to be less in Scotland 
than in the UK. For this reason, and given 
also that the Scottish home ownership rate at 
66%, despite strong growth in the five years 
to 2006, continues to be lower than in the UK 
at 70%, we expect that the impact on the 
Scottish economy of the end of the house 
price boom will be less than in the UK. We 
take the view that the impact on banking and 
financial services will be bigger here than in 
the UK and that there may be a lingering 
negative effect in the long-term. This is 
because the scale of the losses on sub-prime 
and impairments facing the two principal 
Scottish banks, RBS and HBOS, are 
considerable and exceptional compared to 
other UK banks. The losses have pushed 
RBS and HBOS to the brink of bankruptcy. 
This outcome underlines the extent to which 
the lending behaviour of the two banks had 
ceased to be underpinned by the traditional 
risk management practices that had led 
Scottish banking/bankers to be perceived as 
prudent and even ‘canny’. 
 
The effect on the wider Scottish economy of 
the financial crisis will be mediated through 
the following key transmission mechanisms: 
direct demand; intermediate input demand; 
domestic household demand; external 
household demand; credit supply; inward 
investment; and confidence of businesses 
and consumers. Because of the heightened 
levels of uncertainty and the lack of evidence 
sufficient to give us a clear understanding of 
the strength and duration of the 
consequences for each of the transmission 
mechanisms noted above we publish a 
central or base forecast and three alternative 
scenarios. 
 
Our central forecast reveals that from 2007 
there will be five years of below trend growth 
and a fall in output, or recession in 2009. 
Scottish GDP growth will slow from 1.9% in 
2007 to 0.7% in 2008. In 2009, we project 
that GDP will fall by 1.1%, but recession will 
only be evident in that year as growth picks 
up again to 0.7% in 2010, 1.2% in 2011 and 
1.5% in 2012.  For the first time in quite a few 
years Scotland experiences net job losses, 
with over 4,000 lost in 2008, more than 
37,000 lost in 2009, and around 12,000 lost 
in 2010. In 2011, net jobs begin to be created 
again quite quickly with more than 14, 000 
net jobs, rising to net job creation of below 
24,000 in 2012. The scale of the initial job 
losses is sufficient to push up unemployment 
from the historically low levels that the 
Scottish economy has enjoyed over the past 
few years. Unemployment on the ILO 
measure increases from 117,300, or 4.4%, 
peaks at 162,300, or 6.1% in 2010 then falls 
to 151,000, or 5.7%, in 2011, falling further 
to137,300, or 5.2%, in 2012. 
 
On our optimistic scenario, financial and 
housing market impacts are less severe, 
lending behaviour picks up more quickly, 
confidence is re-established sooner, and 
monetary policy is a little more aggressive. 
Here GDP growth slows down in 2008 but by 
less than in the base case falling to 0.8%. 
Similarly, in 2009 the scale of the fall in GDP 
is slightly less at –1% rather than –1.1%. In 
2010, 2011 and 2012 there is a stronger 
recovery as growth rise to 1%, 1.6% and 
1.8% respectively, returning almost to trend 
by 2012. Job losses are also less in this case 
and the recovery in the labour market 
stronger. This has a more favourable impact 
on unemployment than in the base case. 
 
In the recession plus slow recovery case 
there is both a stronger downturn and slower 
recovery than in the central or base case. In 
this scenario, lowered confidence, 
depression in the housing market, 
contraction in the construction and financial 
service sectors are more severe than in the 
base case. Lending behaviour does not 
improve significantly from present levels, and 
monetary policy remains cautious after the 
recent rate cuts. GDP falls by – 1.2% in 2009 
there are considerable job losses of over 
46,000 and the ILO unemployment rate 
increases to 6.3%. Growth hardly recovers in 
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2010 as GDP expands by only 0.6%, nearly 
16,000 net jobs are lost and the 
unemployment rate increases further to 
6.4%. In 2011 and 2012 there is GDP growth 
of 1% and 1.2%, which are well below trend. 
Net jobs begin to be created in these final 
two years by 9,000 and 17,000 respectively 
and the unemployment rate recovers 
somewhat to 6.1% and 5.5%. 
 
Our final case is, a worst-case scenario of 
sustained recession. Here, the seizure of the 
financial system continues for an extended 
period, bank illiquidity persists, lending 
continues to be severely constrained, and 
business confidence remains low. A greater 
contraction in household and investment 
demand follows, leading to negative growth 
for two consecutive years of –1.6% in 2009 
and – 0.4% in 2010. Growth turns weakly 
positive at 0.3% in 2011 and continues no 
better than the 2008 expected growth rate of 
0.7% in 2012. Under this scenario net job 
losses are considerable as the downturn is 
sufficient to produce a shakeout of hoarded 
labour. Net employment falls by 73,000 in 
2009, and by 44,000 in 2010, with some 
improvement thereafter. ILO unemployment 
deteriorates to 6.5% in 2009, peaking at 
7.1% or 187,000 in 2010. In 2011 and 2012 
there is some improvement as the rate falls 
to 6.2% and 5.8%.  
 
 
GDP Performance in first quarter 2008 
 
The latest official outturn data for the Scottish economy refer 
to the second quarter 2008. Total Scottish gross value 
added at real basic prices rose by 0.1% in the quarter and 
by 1.8% over the year. The comparable UK figures were 
0.0% and 2.5%. So, Scotland’s exhibited a marginally 
stronger growth performance than the UK during the 
quarter, but essentially the UK economy was stagnating in 
the second quarter and Scotland’s performance was little 
different, as Figure 1 indicates. 
 
Service sector growth was weaker in Scotland during the 
quarter with an outturn of 0.1% here compared to 0.2% in 
the UK – see Figure 2. Over the year, Scottish and UK 
services grew at broadly the same rate of 3% and 3.1% 
respectively. 
 
Within Scottish services the sector performing the most 
strongly in the second quarter was transport & 
communication with growth of 2.6% compared to 1% in the 
UK. Retail & wholesale grew by 1.7% as against 0.7% in the 
UK and other services grew by 1% compared to zero growth 
in the UK. The remaining four aggregated service sectors 
for which data are published all cut back production in the 
quarter. Hotels & catering, financial services and real estate 
& business services all contracted by 1%, compared to 
mixed performance in their UK counterparts of – 1.9%, 0% 
and +0.2%. The public sector contracted slightly, by 0.1% in 
Scotland, compared to an increase of 0.1% in the UK. Over 
the year, other services grew most quickly at 7.6% (3% in 
the UK), followed by transport & communication 6.7% (1.9% 
in the UK), retail & wholesale 4.8% (2.9% in UK) and hotels 
and catering 0.5% (0.7% in the UK). Financial services was 
the weakest sector over the year, contracting by 4.8% 
compared to a 7.7% rise in the UK. 
 
Manufacturing in Scotland grew by 0.7% in the second 
quarter, in contrast to UK manufacturing, which cut back 
output by 0.9% - see Figure 3. While over the year, GVA in 
Scottish manufacturing rose by 0.7% compared to a rise of 
0.2% in the UK. 
 
Within manufacturing, the relatively stronger Scottish 
performance in the second quarter was driven by 
engineering, chemicals, and other manufacturing. In 
engineering, transport equipment grew by 3.9% (-4.4% over 
the year), mechanical engineering by 1.5% (5.3% over the 
year) and electronics by 0.8% (1.2% over the year). The 
comparable UK figures were, 1% (-0.7%) over the year, -
0.8% (3.6% over the year), and -2% (-0.6% over the year), 
respectively.  Chemicals & man-made fibres exhibited 
growth of 1.4% in Scotland in the second quarter, while 
contracting by 0.4% in the UK. Other manufacturing in 
Scotland grew by 0.9%, while its UK counterpart reduced 
output by 1.4%. At the other extreme the weakest 
manufacturing sectors in Scotland during the quarter were, 
paper, printing & publishing which contracted by 2.7% and 
by 3.2% over the year (-0.2% and 0.6% in the UK, and food 
& drink, which cut back output by 1.5% in the quarter but 
raised output by 3.2% over the year (-2.1% and -1.3% in the 
UK). 
 
Figure 4 brings together the GVA indexes for 10 key sectors 
that are, or have been, significant for the growth of the 
Scottish economy. The figure reveals the continuing 
strength in transport & communication services, the 
weakness in financial services since the 2007q1, the upturn 
in activity in retail & wholesale, and the turndown in hotels & 
catering, real estate & business services, and food & drink 
from 2008q1. 
 
Looking into the abyss 
 
It is now nearly 5 months since we last reported on the 
Scottish economy. Along with most analysts and forecasters 
we failed to anticipate the scale of the subsequent change 
and deterioration in the world economy generally and the 
financial markets specifically. We saw that the US economy 
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was teetering on the brink of recession and that with high 
and rising oil and commodity prices both the US and the 
developed economies faced the spectre of stagflation. We 
also saw the oil price rising further from the then $139 price 
peaking at close to $200 possibly within twelve months and 
then falling to a more sustainable level of $80 to $90 per 
barrel. But we were not sure of the timescale over which 
such a movement would occur. In the event the oil price 
peaked at $147 and has since fallen back to below, and now 
around, $70.  
 
Hence, in the short term, inflation is now much less of a 
problem, while the threat to demand and real output in both 
the US and the major economies, including the UK and 
Scotland, is much greater than we anticipated. On the key 
factors influencing the prospects for the real economy it is 
worth repeating what we said last time:  
 
“It is now well understood that the trigger events in 
the US slowdown stemmed principally from the 
housing market: ending of the house price boom; 
house price falls and higher interest rates; massive 
foreclosures in the sub-prime mortgage market; 
significant bank and hedge fund losses as the value 
of innovative investments based on sub-prime 
mortgages collapsed; and the subsequent drying up 
of liquidity in financial markets, or ‘credit crunch’ as it 
is now popularly known. The loss of trust occasioned 
by the sub-prime crisis has thrown a huge spoke in 
the wheel of the global financial system. Moreover, 
the credit crunch is exceptionally serious because 
……. the problem with the markets isn’t just a lack of 
liquidity, as in many previous financial crises, there’s 
also a fundamental problem of solvency that is still 
not fully identified. Scotland cannot be insulated from 
wider forces. What is still uncertain is the extent of 
the sub-prime losses in the global banking system 
and because of that the degree to which the financial 
system is pulling back from traditional lending 
activities. If that pull back is marked then there is little 
doubt that growth will slow considerably.” 
 
What we did not appreciate was that the collapse of the 
asset price bubble, which was what happened to the 
housing markets in the US and UK, would lead to insolvency 
in so many key financial institutions, the effective 
disintegration of the credit supply mechanism in the global 
economy, and a major pull back from traditional lending 
activities both between the banks and to the wider economy.  
 
There is now almost universal agreement – a possibly 
dubious phenomenon – that the ‘collapse’ of the housing 
market, the scale of the losses experienced by banks and 
other financial service sector firms, and the breakdown of 
credit supply are producing a slowdown in the ‘real’ 
economy of considerable severity. The likely size of such a 
slowdown for any economy is exceptionally difficult to call 
because it depends on the scale of the deflation of house 
and property prices in the domestic market, the scale of the 
impact on local financial service activities, and the spread to 
the wider domestic economy. 
 
Against the background of unprecedented upheaval in the 
financial sector, financial markets and the global economy 
generally, recent economic performance data on GVA and 
employment offer little or no guide to future outcomes. 
Forecasting becomes even more difficult at such times. 
However, we are not completely in the dark. There are 
some guidelines on which we can draw. 
 
First, to derive some sense of the prospects for the Scottish 
economy it is worth looking at what a recession has meant 
in UK and Scottish terms. This should provide a benchmark 
and perhaps framework against which the expected 
downturn can be set. We then turn to the property market 
impacts, the effect on financial services in Scotland, and 
finally, wider economy considerations. 
 
 
Lessons from previous recessions 
It has now become something of a stylised fact that cyclical 
fluctuations of Scottish GDP have less amplitude than in the 
UK economy. What this means is that the cycle is 
considered to be effectively flatter and so both upswings 
and downswings are less severe here. 
 
Figure 5 indicates that since 1963 there have been 3 severe 
recessions in the UK, defined here as a downturn sufficient 
to make annual growth negative for at least one year, in 
1974/75, 1980/81 and 1991. In the UK, there was a 
technical recession of two quarters in 1961 but it lasted no 
more than that. In 1974/75, there were 3 quarters with 
successive negative growth running from the third quarter 
1973, followed by negative growth in the fourth quarter of 
1974, then negative growth again in the second and third 
quarters of 1975. In 1980/81, the recession in the UK was 
altogether more severe both in terms of the scale of output 
contraction and its duration. Output fell by 2.8% and 1.4% 
respectively in 1980 and 1981 and growth was negative for 
5 successive quarters from the first quarter of 1980. 
However, it is worth noting that there was negative growth in 
the first and third quarters of 1979 too. Finally, in 1991 
growth turned negative in the third quarter of 1990 and 
negative growth continued for four further quarters, with 
GVA dropping by 1.5% in 1991 overall. 
 
So, severe recessions in the UK would appear to be 
associated with an annual fall in output of between 1.5% 
and 3% and a duration of negative growth lasting for 5 to 7 
quarters, although not necessarily consecutive quarters. 
 
The data in Figure 5 confirm the view that recessions have 
tended to be less severe in Scotland compared to the UK 
and in 1991 Scotland did not experience a recession. The 
reasons for this are complex reflecting the different structure 
of the Scottish economy, the behaviour of key actors in the 
economy and the source of the recession. Other things 
equal, a somewhat bigger public sector in Scotland and 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
Pages 4-17 
fairly high levels of income compensating social security 
payments have helped the economy weather downturns in 
private sector market demand for goods and services. In 
addition, the higher Scottish household propensity to save 
has tended to relatively protect Scottish household 
expenditure from interest rate hikes as it did in 1991. 
Moreover, the lower degree of home ownership, lesser 
willingness to take on debt also helped Scotland to avoid 
recession in that year. 
 
So what help does this analysis provide in helping to 
forecast the scale of the expected downturn in both 
Scotland and the UK?  
 
We think it unlikely that the recession in prospect will be as 
severe as 1980/81, although we cannot say this with 
certainty. In that recession, monetary and fiscal policy 
effectively accommodated, even exacerbated, the recession 
and was not used counter-cyclically to combat it.  That will 
not happen on this occasion as the recent swingeing cuts in 
interest rates in the UK and the US, and the willingness to 
borrow more and run up higher levels of public debt, 
indicate. Yet, we are unsure about the scale of the 
exogenous demand shock that will hit the economy. A key 
source of the expected downturn is global rather than local 
in nature.  This is somewhat different from previous 
recessions and could make the outcome more severe than 
a recession due to a fall in domestic demand. 
 
Will Scotland suffer by more or less than the UK?  
The evidence is clear that recessions have tended to be 
weaker here for some of the reasons noted. But on this 
occasion we are less sure. We suggested above that the 
impact of the present crisis depends on the scale of the 
deflation of house and property prices in the domestic 
market, the scale of the impact on local financial service 
activities, and the spread to the wider domestic economy. 
On each of these the effect is likely to differ between 
Scotland and the UK. We look at each in turn. 
 
Housing and property market 
The root of the credit crunch lies in the bursting of the asset 
bubble in housing and property markets in the US, UK and 
now in several other countries. The ending of the house and 
property price boom would be expected to affect activity in 
house building and construction and with declining net asset 
values promote a slowdown in household spending. As 
Figure 6 indicates, the construction sector has been weak in 
Scotland for some time, with GVA falling from the 2006q3. 
The same has not applied to UK construction, which peaked 
in the first quarter of this year followed by a fall in GVA of 
0.5% in the 2008q2 compared to a fall of 0.4% in Scotland. 
Data from the latest Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
(SCBS) suggest that the sector continued to contract in the 
third quarter of this year with a large proportion of firms 
expecting lower sales, jobs and profits over the next twelve 
months. The percentage of firms reporting declining 
business confidence was the highest since the survey 
began. 
An examination of data on house prices should offer some 
indication of the likely comparative UK and Scottish impact 
of the ending of the house price boom. Figures 7 and 8 
chart the change in house prices since 1983. Figure 7 
reveals that UK house prices more than tripled from the 
previous trough in house prices in 1993 to the latest peak in 
2007 whereas Scottish house prices rose by just under 2.5 
times the 1993 figure. From Figure 8, it is clear that house 
prices are likely to have fallen by proportionally less in 
Scotland (-3.4%) than in the UK (-8.3%). The figure also 
shows that changes in Scottish house prices lag changes in 
the UK and that the degree of change in house prices here 
tends to be less. We judge from this that both the absolute 
and relative fall in house prices is likely to be less in 
Scotland than in the UK. For this reason, and given also that 
the Scottish home ownership rate at 66%, despite strong 
growth in the five years to 2006, continues to be lower than 
in the UK at 70%, we expect that the impact on the Scottish 
economy of the end of the house price boom will be less 
than in the UK. 
 
Financial services and banking  
We noted in the June 2008 Commentary that financial 
services (8% of economy GVA), for a long time a key driver 
of the Scottish economy, began to stutter in the post 
2005Q1 period with quarterly growth averaging 0.98% 
compared to 2.03% in the earlier period. The weakening 
performance of financial services was much influenced by 
the downturn in the second and third quarters of 2007 with 
GVA falling by 3.4% and 1.8% respectively – see Figure 9. 
What remained unclear was how much this weaker 
performance was related to the “credit crunch” and/or 
whether other factors contributed. In the final quarter of last 
year the sector grew appreciably by 3.8%. However, in the 
first quarter of 2008 the measured GVA of financial services 
fell dramatically by 9.1% and this was followed by a further 
fall of 1.0% in the second quarter. On the face of it this 
suggests that the ‘credit crunch’ was having a significant 
impact on Scottish financial services in the first half of the 
year. It is worth entering a note of caution here, though, 
because UK financial services grew by 2.7% in the first 
quarter of the year and was essentially stagnant exhibiting 
zero growth in the second quarter. To muddy the waters 
further, the Scottish Government’s GVA data on banking 
reveals that the sector grew by 3.6% in the second quarter, 
with the brunt of the contraction in financial services being 
born by the insurance sector, after contracting by more than 
11% in the first quarter. 
 
We conclude that the impact of the ‘credit crunch’ has been 
evident in the financial services sector data for Scotland and 
the effect will become even more clear in the next few 
quarters. But will the impact on financial services be bigger 
here than in the UK as a whole?  
 
We take the view that the impact will be bigger here and that 
there may be a lingering negative effect in the long-term. 
This is because the scale of the losses on sub-prime and 
impairments facing the two principal Scottish banks, RBS 
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and HBOS, are considerable and exceptional compared to 
other UK banks. The losses have pushed RBS and HBOS 
to the brink of bankruptcy. This outcome underlined the 
extent to which the lending behaviour of the two banks had 
ceased to be underpinned by the traditional risk 
management practices that had led Scottish 
banking/bankers to be perceived as prudent and even 
‘canny’.  
 
There is much evidence for this. The new CEO of RBS 
Stephen Hester, in interviews following his appointment, 
made it clear that the bank had lent far too much in good 
times and had fostered a ‘bull market culture’. The position 
at HBOS was even worse with the company seeking to 
become the ‘Tesco of UK banking’
ii
 with an emphasis on 
sales growth and cost efficiency. The company firmly 
believed that such a strategy was not at the cost of 
additional risk, with Phil Hodkinson Group Finance Director, 
stressing that “(t)he combined ratio of cost and impairments 
to income has … fallen over time at HBOS … despite a 
period of worsening impairments in the UK unsecured 
market.”
iii
  With hindsight that statement must be viewed as 
over optimistic at the very least. Added to this it would 
appear that HBOS corporate lending was over focused on 
property and house building companies. So, it is being hit by 
a triple whammy of losses on collateral debt obligations 
(CDOs), based on sub-prime, and rising impairments on 
both the demand and supply sides of the housing and 
property markets. 
 
There will be a short to medium term impact of all of this on 
Scottish banking. Output and jobs will be cut back. The 
government sponsored takeover of HBOS by Lloyds/TSB is 
likely to lead to a rationalisation of the two banks high street, 
back office and HQ operations. But it would be a mistake to 
believe that the prospective job losses are the consequence 
of the takeover. Rather they are the consequence of the 
policies of HBOS management. In the absence of the 
Lloyds/TSB takeover it is almost certain that HBOS would 
have become insolvent and would have had to be directly 
nationalised. Job losses and output contraction would have 
been the inevitable outcome as the UK government sought 
to make it an attractive proposition for an eventual buyer. 
And it might be argued that since Lloyds/TSB has significant 
retail banking overlap with HBOS in Scotland, the potential 
for rationalisation and cost reductions is high and so 
Lloyds/TSB may be able to offer a higher bid price than 
other likely bidders 
 
Further to these direct effects, the two Scottish banks are 
also going to be affected by the rising impairments 
consequent upon a slow down in the wider economy and 
HBOS would appear to be especially exposed to this as we 
note above due its lending focus on property and house 
building businesses. Finally, the banks current unwillingness 
to lend plus a reduction in the demand for loans as the 
economy slows will also help to reduce banks’ income. The 
scale of this will depend on the extent of the slowdown in 
the wider economy, to which we turn in the next section. 
One further point. We should not underestimate the damage 
in the longer term this episode has done, and may yet do, to 
Scotland’s reputation for banking excellence. It seems 
unlikely that RBS will adopt such an aggressive lending and 
growth policy in the future but it might also find it harder to 
win new business when the upturn in the economy 
eventually occurs unless and until confidence in its 
management is fully restored. For an independent HBOS, 
the same problem would apply, and might be worse. But 
absorbed into Lloyds/TSB, which has managed to maintain 
its banking reputation, such problems will be much less. 
 
The wider economy 
The main mechanisms through which the present crisis is 
spreading outside the property and financial markets are 
through falls in: 
 
 intermediate demand impacts on suppliers to 
financial service companies, property developers, 
house builders and construction companies; 
 
 domestic household demand due to the impact of 
asset price deflation – e.g. houses and shares – on 
spending plans, plus the secondary multiplier 
effects of reduced spending by workers and 
shareholders in financial service and property 
related companies; 
 
 external household demand for Scottish goods and 
services – including tourism –  as the crisis 
spreads throughout the world economy lowering 
trade flows; 
 credit supply from banks to investing firms and 
households, as banks seek to rebuild their balance 
sheets via loan restriction and higher charges; 
 
 inward investment from non-Scottish companies 
abroad due to own product demand contraction 
and credit supply restriction; 
 
 confidence of business managers and households, 
a lowering in confidence is likely to reduce 
investment and spending plans independently of 
the direct and secondary demand and price effects 
of the property and financial crisis. 
 
We saw in Figure 4 that and the GVA in real estate & 
business services, hotels & catering, and food & drink had 
turned down during the second quarter of this year. Activity 
in real estate has been clearly affected by the slowdown in 
the property market. The slowdown in hotels and catering, 
and food and drink may reflect the effect of the crisis on 
export sales, with the demand for luxury products such as 
foreign holidays and whisky tending to be cut back early as 
the growth of household incomes worldwide slows. The 
manufacturing export figures for the second quarter support 
this view with foreign exports of food, drink and tobacco 
falling in real terms by 2.5%. It might also be expected that 
Scotland’s production of upmarket textiles products, and 
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clothing would also be hit. Again the export figures for the 
second quarter appear to confirm this with a real fall in sales 
of 6.6%, but this did not affect the production data with GVA 
in the sector rising by 1.8% in the quarter. Overall, the level 
of Scottish manufactured exports was unchanged in 2008q2 
suggesting that the expected slowdown in world incomes 
and trade had only just begun to lap at our shores. 
The impact on domestic household incomes and demand of 
the crisis would be expected to effect retailing activity fairly 
quickly in the downturn. And this appears to have been 
occurring during the second quarter. For while retail & 
wholesale experienced an upturn in GVA (+1.7%) during the 
quarter, at the level of the retail sector alone GVA fell (-
1.8%), all be it against a background of an increase of over 
4% over the year to the second quarter. 
 
We have no official outturn data on production after the 
second quarter. However, survey data are available for the 
third quarter and these are reviewed in the Commentary 
below: A Review of Scottish Business Surveys. These 
surveys broadly confirm the fear that domestic demand, 
production and labour market performance and business 
confidence are deteriorating appreciably. While our Review 
warns that survey results such as these can easily lend 
themselves to an over pessimistic interpretation, and so 
must be treated with caution, there is strong evidence of a 
general slowdown in activity and rising spare capacity with 
inflationary pressures beginning to ease. 
 
 
Forecasts 
 
Forecasting is hedged around with considerable uncertainty 
at the best of times. The best times for forecasting are when 
the economy is exhibiting steady growth, sustained over 
long periods. The worst time, is probably a situation like the 
present where there is clear evidence of a shock to the 
system but insufficient evidence to gain a deep 
understanding of the strength and duration of the 
consequences for each of the transmission mechanisms 
noted above: direct demand; intermediate input demand; 
domestic household demand; external household demand; 
credit supply; inward investment; and confidence of 
businesses and consumers. Because of these heightened 
levels of uncertainty we are publishing a range of forecasts 
based on different scenarios. These are: 
 
 a central or base case; 
 
 an optimistic case; 
 
 a  recession and slow recovery case; 
 
 a sustained recession case 
 
We deal with our central forecast first and then summarise 
the alternative scenarios, with further detail provided in the 
Scottish Forecasts section of this Commentary. 
 
Central forecast 
This is our central case and in our judgement has the 
highest  - but unspecified -probability of occurring. In this 
case the growth of the principal components of aggregate 
demand slows down significantly in 2009 but begin to pick 
up again in 2010 returning to pre-crisis levels in 2011 or 
2012.  Falling asset prices, lowered confidence, the 
depression in the housing market, and contraction in the 
construction and financial service sectors lead to the growth 
of consumer/household demand falling by 0.6% next year. 
Lower business confidence, rapidly slowing aggregate 
demand and credit supply restrictions lead to investment 
demand becoming slightly negative in 2008 (-1.8%), and 
significantly negative in 2009 (-6%). Export growth slows but 
remains positive as weaker sterling offsets to a limited 
extent the slowdown in the growth of world demand and 
trade. 
 
In these circumstances, we are forecasting  - see Figure 10 
- that Scottish GDP growth will slow from 1.9% in 2007 to 
0.7% in 2008. Next year, 2009, we project that GDP will fall 
by -1.1%, but recession will only be evident in that year as 
growth picks up again to 0.7% in 2010, 1.2% in 2011 and 
1.5% in 2012. So this forecast suggests that we shall have 
from 2007, five years of below trend growth and a fall in 
output, or recession in 2009.  
 
Such a slowdown in GDP has implications for the labour 
market. For the first time in quite a few years Scotland 
experiences net job losses, with over 4,000 lost in 2008, 
more than 37,000 lost in 2009, and below 12,000 in 2010. In 
2011, net jobs begin to be created again quite quickly with 
more than 14, 000 net jobs, rising to net job creation of 
below 24,000 in 2012 – see Figure11. 
 
The scale of the job losses is sufficient to push up 
unemployment from the historically low levels that the 
Scottish economy has enjoyed over the past few years – 
see Figure 12. Unemployment on the ILO measure rises 
from 117,300, or 4.4%, in 2008 to 152,300, 5.7% in 2009, 
and peaks at 162,300, or 6.1% in 2010. The effect of the 
slowdown in GDP and jobs growth has a lagged effect on 
unemployment. By 2011, the unemployment rate has begun 
to fall to 151,000, or 5.7%, falling further to137,300, or 5.2% 
in 2012. 
 
Alternative scenarios 
Figures 10, 11 and 12 graph the expected outturn for GDP 
growth, net jobs change and the ILO unemployment rate 
over the forecast horizon under our alternative scenarios.  
 
On our optimistic scenario financial and housing market 
impacts are less severe, lending behaviour picks up more 
quickly, confidence is re-established sooner, and monetary 
policy is a little more aggressive. Here GDP growth slows 
down in 2008 but by less than in the central case falling to 
0.8%. Similarly, in 2009 the scale of the fall in GDP is 
slightly less at –1% rather than –1.1%. In 2010, 2011 and 
2012 there is a stronger recovery as growth rise to 1%, 
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1.6% and 1.8% respectively, returning almost to trend by 
2012. Job losses are also less in this case and the recovery 
in the labour market stronger, with net job change of -32,470 
in 2009, -4,992 in 20010, 23,669 in 2011 and 29,876 in 
2012. This has a more favourable impact on unemployment 
than in the central case. 
 
In the recession plus slow recovery case there is both a 
stronger downturn and slower recovery than in the central or 
base case. In this scenario, lowered confidence, depression 
in the housing market, contraction in the construction and 
financial service sectors are more severe than in the central 
case. Lending behaviour does not improve significantly from 
present levels, and monetary policy remains cautious after 
the recent rate cuts. GDP falls by – 1.2% in 2009 there are 
considerable job losses of over 46,000 and the ILO 
unemployment rate increases to 6.3%. Growth hardly 
recovers in 2010 as GDP expands by only 0.6%, nearly 
16,000 net jobs are lost and the unemployment rate 
increases further to 6.4%. However, by 2011 and 2012 GDP 
growth increases further to 1% and 1.2% but remains well 
below trend. Net jobs begin to be created in the final two 
years by 9,000 and 17,000 respectively and the 
unemployment rate recovers somewhat to 6.1% and 5.5%. 
 
Our final case is, in our view, a worst-case scenario of 
sustained recession. Here, the seizure of the financial 
system continues for an extended period, bank illiquidity 
persists, lending continues to be severely constrained, and 
business confidence remains low. This leads to a greater 
contraction in household and investment demand, with 
negative growth for two consecutive years of –1.6% in 2009 
and – 0.4% in 2010. Growth turns weakly positive at 0.3% in 
2011 and continues no better than this year’s expected 
growth rate of 0.7% in 2012. Under this scenario net job 
losses are considerable as the downturn is sufficient to 
produce a shakeout of hoarded labour. Net employment 
falls by 73,000 in 2009, and by 44,000 in 2010. Weak net 
job creation occurs in 2011 of just over 2,000 jobs and 8,000 
jobs in 2012. ILO unemployment deteriorates to 6.5% in 
2009, peaking at 7.1% or 187,000 in 2010. In 2011 and 
2012 there is some improvement as the rate falls to 6.2% 
and 5.8% but these rates remain well above present levels. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
10 November 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes: 
i
Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 31 October 2008. 
ii
From speech by HBOS Group Finance Director, Phil 
Hodkinson, Goldman Sachs Conference, 15 June 2007. 
iii
ibid 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2008q2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services Quarterly GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
 
 
Figure 3:  Scottish and UK Manufacturing Quarterly GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 4:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 2002q1 to 2008q2 
 
 
Figure 5:  GVA Growth Recessions in the UK and Scotland 1963 to 2007 
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Figure 6:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2008q2 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Annual Average House Prices in Scotland and UK, 1983 to 2008, 1983 = 100 
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Figure 8:  Change in Average House Prices in Scotland and UK, 1983 to 2008, 1983 = 100 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2008q2 
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Figure 10:  Forecast Scottish GVA Growth 2008 to 2012 - Different Scenarios 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Forecast Net Jobs Change, 2008 to 2012 - Different Scenarios 
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Figure 12:  ILO Unemployment Rate Forecast, 2008-2012 - Different Scenarios 
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